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Having done research on various aspects of ethanol pro-
duction and policy for several years, we decided to take 
stock of what we have learned so far for this paper. Of 
course, our research has benefitted from the work of many 
others, and we will try to capture some of that work as 
well. An assessment of where we are now is particularly 
important because so many changes have occurred in ag-
riculture that are affected by ethanol growth and policy. 
Furthermore, the U.S. ethanol subsidy is set to expire in 
2010, so Congressional action will be taken in 2009 to de-
termine what form future U.S. ethanol policy will take. We 
will group the items under the following general categories: 
linkages between energy and agriculture, biofuels and com-
modity prices, policy analysis, the blending wall, cellulosic 
ethanol issues, and global biofuels impacts. We have done 
our research using firm level models, as well as partial and 
general equilibrium analysis. 
Energy and Agriculture Linkages
Historically, the correlation between energy product and 
agricultural product prices has been quite low (Tyner and 
Taheripour, 2008a and 2008b). The forces determining 
crude oil and other energy product prices have largely been 
different from those determining agricultural commodity 
prices. However, today, with agriculture being called upon 
to produce not only food, feed, and fiber, but also fuel, that 
is all changing. We have shown that in the future, corn and 
crude oil prices can be expected to move together. Previ-
ously, we demonstrated that with break–even analysis at 
the firm level (Tyner and Taheripour, 2008c), and more 
recently with partial equilibrium analysis (Tyner and Ta-
heripour, 2008a and 2008b). The Iowa State group among 
others reach similar conclusions (Elobeid et al., 2007; Tol-
goz et al., 2007; McPhail and Babcock, 2008a and 2008b). 
Figure 1 illustrates the combination of corn and crude oil 
prices which maintain the U.S. ethanol industry at the 
break–even  condition  under  alternative  policy  options. 
Policy options in this figure are: 45 cent fixed subsidy ef-
fective January 2009 (Fixed Sub); no ethanol subsidy (No 
Sub), a subsidy which varies with the price of curde oil (Var 
Sub), and the 15 billion gallon ethanol Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS) (U.S. Congress, 2007).  The fixed blender’s 
credit was changed in the 2008 Farm Bill (U.S. Congress, 
2008) from 51 to 45 cents for corn ethanol. In addition, 
for cellulosic ethanol, there is now an additional produc-
tion tax credit of 46 cents, a small producer credit of 10 
cents and the standard blender’s credit of 45 cents bringing 
the total cellulose credit to $1.01.
Figure 1 shows that the crude and corn prices move 
up together under all alternative policy options. We have 
called this a revolution in American and global agricul-
ture. Since ethanol is a near perfect substitute for gasoline, 
higher gasoline price means more demand for ethanol and 
induces investment in ethanol plants. More ethanol plants 
and production means more demand for corn, which, in 
turn, means higher corn prices. The same is true going in 
the downward direction. If oil price were to fall, less etha-
nol would be demanded, corn would be freed up for other 
uses, and corn price would fall. 
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Biofuels and Commodity Prices
There is no doubt that ethanol pro-
duction in the United States has con-
tributed to higher corn prices. A large 
portion of the growth in corn demand 
is associated with growth in ethanol 
production. In the European Union 
(EU), the same is true for biodiesel 
and vegetable oils. Between 2004 and 
earlier in 2008, crude oil went from 
$40  to  $120.  Over  that  same  time 
period, corn went from about $2 to 
about $6. With the results from our 
prior  work  (Tyner  and  Taheripour, 
2008a, 2008b, and 2008c) one can 
partition the $4 corn price increase 
into two parts: price increase due to 
the  U.S.  ethanol  subsidy  and  price 
increase due to the demand pull of 
higher crude oil price. The result is 
that about $1 of the increase is due to 
the US subsidy and $3 to the crude 
oil price increase. The crude oil price 
increased due to many factors such as 
higher demand for crude oil, devalua-
tion of the U.S. dollar, political insta-
bility in the Middle East, and many 
other factors. So the crude oil price is 
the major driver in corn price increas-
es, and the U.S. ethanol subsidy less 
so. Of course that was not the case be-
fore the surge in crude oil prices. Prior 
to 2005, the ethanol industry would 
not have existed without the subsidy. 
In our earlier work (Tyner and Ta-
heripour,  2007),  we  estimated  that 
with corn around $2 and no subsidy, 
$60 oil would be required for profit-
able ethanol production. Oil did not 
reach $60 until 2006, so the whole 
development of the ethanol industry 
was  enabled  by  the  subsidy. Today, 
the oil price is the larger driver.
Policy Analysis
In addition to the subsidy, the Unit-
ed States has other policies in effect 
as  well—a  renewable  fuel  standard 
(RFS) and a tariff on imported etha-
nol. The RFS (U.S. Congress, 2007) 
has to date not been binding; that is, 
the market plus the subsidy have al-
ways produced a higher amount than 
the  level  of  the  RFS.  Our  analysis 
indicates that if oil stays above $120, 
the mandate will not become bind-
ing under normal circumstances. The 
market would produce more than the 
amount dictated by the mandate. Of 
course, if weather events such as the 
2008  flood  occurred,  the  mandate 
could become binding in any given 
year. However, the EPA administra-
tor has authority to waive or reduce 
the RFS under that type of circum-
stance. The major qualification to this 
conclusion would be a continuation 
of very high corn production input 
prices such that the market would be 
unwilling  to  produce  enough  corn 
to meet the ethanol, food, feed, and 
export demands without substantially 
higher corn prices. Under that con-
dition,  especially  if  oil  prices  were 
relatively lower, ethanol plants would 
bring production down to the man-
date  level,  and  the  mandate  would 
become binding. 
Another U.S. policy is the import 
tariff. The import tariff originally was 
established  to  offset  the  U.S.  etha-
nol  subsidy,  which  applies  to  both 
domestic  and  imported  ethanol. 
Clearly, Congress wanted to subsidize 
domestic but not imported ethanol, 
so the tariff accomplished that objec-
tive. Early on, the specific tariff was 
equal to the domestic subsidy of 54 
cents per gallon. However, since then 
the subsidy was reduced to 51 cents 
and will be reduced again in January 
2009 to 45 cents per gallon. In addi-
tion to the specific tariff of 54 cents 
per gallon, there is also an ad valorem 
tariff of 2.5%. The total tariff today 
for an import price of $2/gal. is 59 
cents/gal., quite a bit more than the 
45 cent U.S. subsidy. Brazilian sugar-
cane based ethanol is much cheaper 
to produce than U.S. corn ethanol, 
especially at today’s corn prices. Three 
years  ago,  Brazilian  ethanol  was  in 
the range of $1.10–$1.20, but with 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar, it is 
now  about  $1.70  even  though  the 
Brazilian domestic cost has changed 
little. Adding transport cost and the 
tariff to that cost figure makes Brazil-
ian ethanol not generally competitive 
in the U.S. market today. Imports in 
2008 to date are far below the 2006 
level. However, if the tariff were re-
duced  significantly  or  eliminated, 
there could be substantial imports of 
Brazilian and Central American etha-
nol. If that were to happen, it would 
likely reduce pressure on corn prices. 
Thus, the import tariff is an impor-
tant policy instrument.
The Blending Wall
The blending wall refers to the maxi-
mum amount of ethanol that could be 
blended at the current national blend-
ing level of 10%. Since we consume 
about 140 billion gallons of gasoline 
annually,  the  theoretical  maximum 
amount  of  ethanol  that  could  be 
blended as E10 is 14 billion gallons. 
The practical limit, at least in the near 
term, is more like 12 billion gallons 
(Tyner,  Dooley,  Hurt,  and  Quear, 
2008). We already have in place or 
under construction 13 billion gallons 
of ethanol capacity. At present E85 is 
tiny, and it would take quite a while 
to build that market. There are only 
about 1,700 E85 pumps in the nation 
and few of the flex–fuel vehicles that 
are required to consume the fuel. We 
would need a massive investment to 
make E85 pumps readily available for 
all consumers, and a huge switch to 
flex–fuel vehicle manufacture and sale 
to grow this market. Without strong 
government intervention, it will not 
happen.
What options exist? The most popu-
lar  among  the  ethanol  industry  is 
switching to E15 or E20 instead of 
E10. The major problem is that auto-
mobile manufacturers believe the ex-
isting fleet is not suitable for anything 
over E10. Switching to a higher blend 
would void warranties on the existing 
fleet  and  potentially  pose  problems 
for older vehicles not under warranty. 
In the United States, the automobile 
fleet turns over in about 14 years, so 
it is a long term process. We could 
not add yet another pump for E15 or 8  CHOICES  3rd Quarter 2008 • 23(3) 
The third risk is RFS implementa-
tion. Each year, EPA in consultation 
with DOE and USDA must decide 
the level of the RFS for the next year 
for cellulosic ethanol (and the other 
categories included in the RFS). It is 
unclear how this will be done. Given 
the rules of the RFS, it appears  if 
the level is set high enough to absorb 
all  cellulosic  ethanol  produced,  the 
firms  would  be  able  to  market  the 
ethanol at a price a bit higher than 
energy  equivalent  gasoline,  but  not 
substantially higher. There is an op-
tion for blenders to pay 25 cents per 
gallon for a Renewable Fuel Identifi-
cation Number (RIN) in lieu of actu-
ally blending the fuel. Again, it is not 
clear how this will be implemented. 
The bottom line is that there is con-
siderable policy uncertainty, and that 
uncertainty also will impede invest-
ment.
Finally, there will be difficulties se-
curing raw material supply. It is likely 
that potential cellulosic investors will 
want to be assured raw material sup-
ply  before  sinking  steel  and  laying 
concrete.  Cellulosic  ethanol  plants 
will have to source locally, unlike corn 
ethanol plants. Two potential sources 
are corn stover and switchgrass. They 
are quite different in many ways. First, 
according  to  our  analysis  (Brechbill 
and Tyner, 2008) corn stover is sub-
stantially cheaper that switchgrass. It 
costs about $40 per dry ton compared 
with $60 for switchgrass. This cost in-
cludes fertilizer replacement but does 
not place a value on soil carbon re-
duction. The literature on this topic 
is not consistent, but our reading is 
that most scientists who have worked 
on the issue conclude that one–third 
to one–half of the residue could be 
removed without subsequent adverse 
yield  effects  (Barber,  1979;  Benoit 
and Lindstrom, 1987; Karlen, Hurt, 
and Campbell, 1984; Linden, Clapp 
and  Dowby,  2000;  and  Lindstrom, 
1986). Second, corn stover and other 
residues or waste products clearly and 
unequivocally reduce GHG emissions 
(because there is little or no direct or 
indirect land use change). It might be 
argued  that  the  additional  revenue 
stream from corn stover would induce 
more corn planting. There might be a 
very small effect, but we argue that 
the  incremental  net  revenue  would 
not be sufficient to cause a significant 
area shift.
Third, corn (and thus corn stover) 
is  an  annual  crop,  whereas  switch-
grass and similar crops are perenni-
als, meaning in this case that they are 
planted and harvested over a period 
of about 10 years. Ethanol plants will 
want  to  contract  with  farmers  for 
supply of raw materials. It should be 
easier  to  come  up  with  contracting 
and risk sharing mechanisms for corn 
stover than for a crop like switchgrass 
that will require long–term contracts. 
This will be new territory for farmers 
and ethanol producers alike. And un-
like corn ethanol, all the raw material 
must  be  sourced  locally—normally 
within 50 miles of the plant. There-
fore, we must develop new contract-
ing and risk sharing mechanisms to 
protect  both  farmers  and  ethanol 
producers.
The  2008  Farm  Bill  contains  a 
provision  providing  incentives  for 
farmers to plant and grow cellulosic 
feedstock. It is sort of a plant it, and 
they will come provision. In our view, 
it is ill–conceived in that it will not 
ensure  the  supply  for  a  plant.  The 
only  way  dedicated  cellulose  crops 
will get off the ground is if adequate 
private  contracting  mechanisms  are 
developed. The University of Tennes-
see is doing good work on this issue. 
We will need to deal with all these 
issues to successfully launch a cellu-
lose ethanol industry. In terms of pol-
icy, perhaps a variable subsidy would 
be first choice since that is the main 
mechanism for reducing oil price risk 
at low cost. Extension services might 
be  used  to  help  bring  farmers  and 
ethanol producers together to ham-
mer out acceptable contract terms for 
raw  material  supply.  Consideration 
might  be  given  to  providing  better 
E20. The costs would be huge. So the 
blending wall in the near term is an 
effective barrier to growth of the etha-
nol industry. Without a breakthrough 
(such as cost effective butanol produc-
tion), the EPA administrator will be 
forced to cap the RFS far below the 
planned levels—to the levels that can 
be blended at E10 plus whatever can 
be sold as E85.
Cellulosic Ethanol Issues
Cellulosic  ethanol  development  is 
fraught with risks. There are at least 
four categories of risks: oil price un-
certainty,  technological  uncertainty, 
RFS  implementation  uncertainty, 
and  raw  material  supply  and  con-
tracting  uncertainty.  A  100  million 
gallon cellulosic ethanol plant is ex-
pected to have a capital cost of at least 
$400 million at current prices. It is 
unlikely investment will occur with-
out policies aimed at addressing these 
uncertainties. We will discuss each in 
turn.
Cellulosic ethanol is likely to be 
economic at oil prices of $140 and 
higher. However, there is absolutely 
no  assurance  oil  price  will  remain 
that high. Indeed, at this writing it is 
substantially below that level. A pol-
icy, such as a variable subsidy, could 
help alleviate the oil price uncertainty 
risk. Investment is unlikely without 
some change in policy. There are no 
commercial ethanol plants today. The 
increase in the cellulose subsidy de-
scribed above is set to expire in 2012, 
before cellulosic production will oc-
cur, so it will not provide an incentive 
to invest unless promptly extended. 
Many companies and universities are 
doing path–breaking work to develop 
viable  technologies.  However,  mov-
ing from laboratory or even demon-
stration scale to commercial scale is 
quite a leap. It is difficult for govern-
ment policy options to provide pro-
tection  against  technical  risk.  Over 
time, the market will accomplish that 
with firms which are able to produce 
economically being the survivors.  3rd Quarter 2008 • 23(3)  CHOICES  9
information on RFS implementation 
for cellulosic ethanol to help reduce 
the government policy uncertainty.
Global Biofuels Impacts
Many countries have announced and 
implemented plans and programs to 
increase production and use of bio-
fuels renewable energy. In both the 
United States and the EU programs 
are already in effect that either require 
or  provide  incentives  for  significant 
production of bioenergy. China, In-
dia, Indonesia, and Malaysia, among 
others, also have announced and im-
plemented biofuels initiatives. More 
than 13 billion gallons of bio–ethanol 
and about 2 billion gallons of biodie-
sel were produced globally in 2007. 
The ethanol production is driven by 
a combination of high oil prices and 
government  support.  Biodiesel  pro-
duction is driven mainly by govern-
ment support, as it is further from be-
ing economic without policy support 
(OECD, 2008).
This large–scale global implemen-
tation of bioenergy production causes 
global economic, environmental, and 
social consequences. It can affect the 
global  economy  in  several  ways.  In 
addition, it induces major land use 
changes across the whole globe which 
may lead to significant environmental 
impacts. To assess the global impacts 
of  biofuel  production,  a  computa-
tional  general  equilibrium  (CGE) 
framework has been developed. This 
framework  builds  upon  the  stan-
dard  Global  Trade  Analysis  Project 
(GTAP)  database  and  modeling 
framework and modifies it in several 
ways. Three types of biofuels (ethanol 
from sugarcane, ethanol from crops, 
and biodiesel from oilseed) and their 
byproducts    -  distillers  dried  grains 
with soluble (DDGS) and biodiesel 
byproducts  (BDBP)  -  are  explicitly 
introduced into the standard GTAP 
model. The new framework has been 
used in several research activities to 
examine  global  impacts  of  biofuel 
production.  In  this  short  paper  we 
address some key findings of these re-
search activities. In particular, we re-
port some results from Hertel, Tyner, 
and Birur (2008), and Taheripour et 
al. (2008). 
Hertel, Tyner,  and  Birur  (2008) 
have  examined  the  implications  of 
U.S. and EU biofuel mandate policies 
for  the  world  economy  during  the 
time period of 2006–2015. According 
to this paper, biofuel mandates sharp-
ly increase the production of coarse 
grains  (mainly  corn)  in  the  United 
States and production of oilseeds in 
the United States, EU and Brazil. The 
United States and EU would use a 
large portion of their corn and oilseed 
outputs to meet their biofuel man-
dates for 2015. In the United States, 
the share of corn used in ethanol pro-
duction could increase from 12.7% 
in 2006 to 29.9% in 2015, while the 
share of oilseeds going to biodiesel in 
the EU could increase from 23.3% in 
2006 to 69.2% in 2015. The United 
States and EU mandates policies in-
teract, and the most dramatic interac-
tion between these policies is for the 
U.S. oilseed production. While, the 
U.S.  mandates  alone  would  reduce 
U.S.  oilseed  production,  the  com-
bination  of  both  the  U.S.  and  EU 
mandates would increase oilseed pro-
duction in the United States. In gen-
eral, about one–third of the growth 
in the U.S. crop cover is attributed 
to the EU mandates. The U.S.–EU 
mandates affect the rest of the world 
as well. The combined policies have 
a much greater impact than just the 
United States or just the EU policies 
alone, with crop cover rising sharply 
in Latin America, Africa and Oceania 
as a result of the combined U.S.– EU 
biofuel mandates. These increases in 
crop  cover  come  at  the  expense  of 
pasture (first and foremost) as well as 
commercial forest. 
Taheripour  et  al.  (2008)  have 
revealed the importance of incorpo-
rating  biofuel  byproducts  into  the 
economic  analysis  of  biofuels  poli-
cies. The model with byproducts re-
veals that production of DDGS and 
BDBP  would  grow  sharply  in  the 
United States and EU. For example, 
the U.S. production of DDGS would 
grow from 12.5 million metric tons 
in  2006  to  34  million  metric  tons 
in 2015. A major portion of this by-
product  would  be  used  within  the 
United  States,  and  the  rest  would 
be  exported  to  other  regions  such 
as Canada, the EU, Mexico, China, 
Africa and Asia.. On the other hand, 
the EU production of BDBP would 
grow from about 6.1 million metric 
tons in 2006 to 32.5 million metric 
tons in 2015. The EU production of 
BDBP would be mainly used within 
the region. 
The CGE models with and with-
out byproducts tell quite different sto-
ries regarding the economic impacts 
of the United States and EU biofuel 
mandates for the world economy in 
2015.  While  both  models  demon-
strate significant changes in the agri-
cultural production pattern across the 
world,  the  model  with  byproducts 
shows smaller changes in the produc-
tion of cereal grains and larger chang-
es for oilseeds products in the United 
States  and  EU,  and  the  reverse  for 
Brazil. For example, as shown in Fig-
ure 2, the U.S. production of cereal 
grains increases by 10.8% and 16.4% 
with and without byproducts, respec-
tively.  The  difference  between  these 
two  numbers  corresponds  to  646 
million bushels of corn which could 
be used to produce about 1.7 billion 
gallons of ethanol. This is really a big 
number to ignore and disregard in the 
economic analyses of biofuel produc-
tion.
With byproducts included in the 
model, prices change less due to the 
mandate  policies.  For  example,  the 
model  with  no  byproducts  predicts 
that the price of cereal grains grows 
22.7%  in  the  United  States  during 
the time period of 2006 to 2015. The 
corresponding number for the model 
with byproducts is 14%. Introducing 
byproducts into the model alters the 
trade  effects  of  the  U.S.–EU  man-10  CHOICES  3rd Quarter 2008 • 23(3) 
date policies as well. For example, the 
model with no byproducts estimates 
that the U.S. exports of coarse grains 
to  the  EU,  Brazil,  and  the  Latin 
American region would drop sharply 
by –4.8%, –25.5%, and –12.7%, re-
spectively. The corresponding figures 
for  the  model  with  byproducts  are 
–2.1%, –15.7%, and –7.9%. 
Next Steps
We have learned a lot in the econom-
ic analysis done to date, but there is 
much more work needed. Our next 
step is to improve the data and mod-
els such that we will be able to esti-
mate global land use changes induced 
by national biofuels programs. Land 
use changes are important in estimat-
ing greenhouse gas emissions changes 
associated with biofuels. 
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of biofuel production. 
Figure 2. Percentage change in coarse grain production due to the  
U.S. and EU biofuel mandate policies 2006–2015
With byproducts included in the model, prices change less due to the mandate policies. 
For example, the model with no byproducts predicts that the price of cereal grains grows 22.7% 
in the United States during the time period of 2006 to 2015. The corresponding number for the 
model with byproducts is 14%. Introducing byproducts into the model alters the trade effects of 
the U.S.–EU mandate policies as well. For example, the model with no byproducts estimates that 
the U.S. exports of coarse grains to the EU, Brazil, and the Latin American region would drop 
sharply by –4.8%, –25.5%, and –12.7%, respectively. The corresponding figures for the model 
with byproducts are –2.1%, –15.7%, and –7.9%.
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